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Abstract 
 
Public power has been justified by resorting to two different kinds of legitimation: one 
coming from above, the other emerging from the governed. While legitimation “from 
above” implies that those who are vested with executive power are qualified in their 
function because of their allegedly higher competences, “bottom-up” legitimacy always 
presupposes that only citizens can properly decide on their destiny. After giving a brief 
account of how both legitimation strategies have developed in the history of political ideas, 
attention is focused on the theories regarding the legitimacy of public power in the 
European Union. Indeed, both strands of legitimation of public power are represented 
here with original proposals, according to the specificity of the supranational condition. 
But even more interesting is that the research into the characteristics of supranational 
integration has been one of the most significant fields in which the legitimation “from 
above” has reappeared in Western thought after a rather long period of marginality, now 
taking the shape of a technocratic justification. In the main section of the article, the 
reasons in favour of a democratic “bottom-up” legitimation of the European public power 
are analyzed first, then those which recur to the so-called “output legitimacy” – in other 
words to technocratic arguments. The last section of the contribution is dedicated to an 
overall assessment of the different positions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The power of the European Union – like any other power in a social and institutional 
context – is characterized by different dimensions, all of which, however, are united by a 
common element, namely legitimacy. In fact, only a power which is recognized as 
legitimate can demand to be obeyed, while an authority without obedience is merely 
abstract and, in the concreteness of social life, factually void. An essential element of the 
legitimacy of power consists in its source: the claim to obedience is recognized as justified 
only if the foundation of authority – which I define, here, as the tangible expression of 
power – is generally regarded as well-grounded and thus accepted. Limiting the analysis to 
the public dimension of power and concentrating on its sources, we can identify two 
opposite conceptions. According to the first, public power originates “from above” as an 
expression of strength, tradition, natural order, or divine will. On the basis of the second 
conception, instead, legitimate power can only originate “from below”, i.e., from the free 
and reflexive will of those who decide to constitute a public power and to abide by its 
decisions. The dichotomy between the paradigm asserting the “descending” origin of the 
legitimacy of public power and its “ascending” counterpart is concisely presented in the 
next Section (2). 
The analysis of characteristics and perspectives of public power in the European Union 
(EU) from the standpoint of the dichotomy between "descending" and "ascending" 
paradigms deserves attention in particular for one reason. In fact, over the last decades the 
debate on the EU has been a significant breeding ground for the renewal of the “top-
down” understanding of the legitimacy of public power which had factually and 
theoretically disappeared from the political horizon of Western democracies. More 
specifically, it is precisely a certain interpretation of EU power and of its legitimacy that 
takes up the idea of an authority justified on the basis of an alleged superiority of elites, 
thus revitalizing a conception which was largely regarded as belonging to the pre-
democratic past. Therefore, the third Section will focus on how the dichotomy between 
"top-down" and "bottom-up" power can be applied to the debate on the EU public power 
(3). 
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The current economic, institutional, political, social and – we could also add – ethical 
crisis of the EU has shed new light on the opposing paradigms as well as on the possible 
solutions that can be formulated on the basis of their conceptual frameworks. The final 
Section is dedicated to some considerations on the future of the EU from the perspective 
of the conflicting understandings of public power, as well as to a cautious, but nevertheless 
passionate defense of the “ascending” concept of legitimacy (4). 
 
2. “Descending” and “Ascending” Understandings of  the Legitimacy 
of  Public Power 
 
In classical political thought, the theory of the different forms of government was 
based on the number of rulers (Bobbio 1985: 129). Since Aristotle, we had three patterns 
of public power: the monarchy, or the government of one person; the aristocracy, or the 
government of the few; and democracy, or the rule of the many. It was Hans Kelsen who 
introduced a fundamental turning point: from a quantitative distinction – with a potentially 
unlimited number of typologies – he switched to a qualitative difference, based on a 
dichotomy and, thus, on only two ideal types of government (Kelsen 1949: 283). The 
discriminating element is identified in the method adopted for the creation and justification 
of the legal order. In the first case the process is “descending”, in the sense that power falls 
down from above to those who are vested with it, while the subjects are largely excluded 
from the decisions. Kelsen calls this form of government "autocratic”. In the second case 
the power “ascends” from the governed; in other words, it is originally vested in the 
individuals and arises from them to those who are chosen to govern the political 
community. This is the fundamental feature of what we call “democracy”. Kelsen’s novelty 
brought a significant simplification; furthermore, it introduced also an explicit normative 
dimension. According to Kelsen, indeed, in a society which is no longer characterized by a 
predetermined and passively shared idea of the good life, the legitimation of power can 
only proceed from those who are obliged to abide by its rules (Kelsen 1929: 102). Although 
only introduced relatively recently, the taxonomy of the forms of public power on the basis 
of its provenance – and of the sources of its legitimacy – can be easily applied backwards, 
allowing a dichotomous interpretation of the history of political thought.  
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2.1. The “Descending” Conception of Public Power 
Insofar as the first term of the dichotomy is concerned, public power is regarded as 
"descending" for two reasons: first, the holders of power claim to derive it from above, 
mostly from natural or divine authority; secondly, the authority "descends" from the rulers 
to the ruled, whereby the marginal involvement of the latter is far from fulfilling the 
conditions for genuine autonomy. Examples of public power derived from the law of 
nature have accompanied us for most of the history of Western political thought. Starting 
from ancient times – and from the two most famous exponents of ancient political 
philosophy – in both Plato’s “justice”-based politeia (Plato 1901: IV, 433b) and Aristotle’s 
idea of the organic political community, which aims at realizing “happiness” (Aristotle 
1967: I, 2, 1252b), the social functions of the citizens depend on the immediate expression 
of their natural qualities. Moreover, the identification of these qualities is ultimately a 
decision imposed from above and not the expression of a free individual preference. 
Therefore, if the tasks carried out in the community are directly derived from the natural 
abilities of individuals and the ruling class is seen as a specific component of the organic 
whole, connected to the rest but also functionally separate from it, then the holders of 
public power must be chosen by cooptation on the basis of alleged innate qualities that 
would predestine them for the exercise of authority. 
After a period in which – during the Middle Ages – the "descending” character of 
authority was justified by resorting to a supposed divine will, the reference to natural order 
as the basis for legitimate power became central again in Jean Bodin’s theory of 
sovereignty. In the first of his Six Livres de la République, introducing the fundamental 
elements of his philosophy, he asserted that “sovereignty is the absolute and perpetual 
power present in a political community (République)” (Bodin 1579: 85). As a result, the 
sovereign is legibus solutus and the laws promulgated by him “only depend on his pure and 
free will” (Bodin 1579: 92). To justify sovereign power, Bodin relied on Aristotle’s theory 
of the familistic origin of the political community. According to this, the République “is the 
well-ordered government of many families and of what is common to them by a sovereign 
power” (Bodin 1579: 1). The premise, here, is twofold: first, in accordance with the law of 
nature the power within the family lies – or, I prefer to say, lied in Bodin’s times – in the 
hands of the pater familias and cannot – or could not – be contested by any of its members. 
Secondly, since the political community is nothing but an extended family, that same power 
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which is derived, in the family, from the order established by the law of nature, is 
legitimately placed – if the focus switches from the smallest natural community to that 
larger family which is the state – in the hands of the no less natural holder of public 
authority. Nor are the subjects entitled to require any kind of justification for this state of 
facts, which is supposed to be given by nature. 
For a second strand of Western political thought, however, the reference to natural law 
is only the first step on the way that leads to an even higher truth, namely to the law of 
God. Public power, here, comes from God as the only true holder of sovereignty. The way 
in which sovereignty descends, then, from God to the temporal powers was differently 
interpreted by the Christian – and then Christian-Catholic – political theology between the 
Middle Ages and the early Modern Ages. In accordance with the first and most radical 
understanding, power was transferred by God to the Church and, only in a second step, 
from this to the secular power (Henricus Hostiensis 1250–1261). A later version still 
derived the power of mundane sovereigns from God, but directly and not going through 
papal mediation (Vitoria 1528: 58). The most progressive variant of the Catholic theology 
of the School of Salamanca went even further, stating that the transition of the legitimate 
power from God to the worldly rulers had to include the passage through popular 
sovereignty. Nonetheless, the people were actually excluded, after having transferred the 
government to the rulers, from the possibility of effectively influencing the decision-
making-processes (Suarez 1612: 361). In general, all conceptions which derived public 
power from divine law can be regarded as belonging to the past, at least in the Western 
world. However, the idea that sovereign authority is legitimate only if it respects the higher 
law of God still survives to this day also within the context of Western political culture, in a 
broad sense, in the guise of the concept of dignity (McCrudden 2013; Cartabia/Simoncini 
2015). In fact, if power has to protect human dignity in order to be considered legitimate 
and, on the other hand, the Catholic Church retains the competence to define what is to be 
human dignity, then the result can only be that the Church still maintains the claim to 
possess – however indirectly – the key to sovereign power, as well as that the interpretation 
of the divine law should continue to be the benchmark of the secular order.  
After several centuries characterized by the progressive prevalence of the 
“revolutionary” concept of the ascendant legitimacy, a third form of “top-down” power 
was introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century, which is strictly connected with 
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the development of the bureaucratic-administrative state. It was Max Weber who 
distinguished, in his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft of 1922, between three ideal types of 
legitimation of power (Weber 1922: 122). Beside the “traditional” legitimacy, which bears 
the traits of the “descendant” power of mythological and religious origin, and the 
“charismatic”, which focuses on personal leadership, we have here a third ideal type of 
legitimacy which is called by Weber “rational”. This is characterized by three factors: a) an 
effective legal system in order to regulate social relations and to give predictability to 
interactions; b) an efficient bureaucracy with hierarchical structure; and c) the presumption 
that the holders of power and, in general, the members of the bureaucratic apparatus are 
endowed with better skills and superior knowledge. Unlike the others, this form of 
legitimacy belongs explicitly and exclusively to modern society. Nonetheless, it is no less 
“descending” than the “traditional” or the “charismatic” forms of legitimacy for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, law does not primarily play the function of defining spaces for the 
development of the positive freedom of individuals, i.e., of their participation in the 
decision-making-processes. On the contrary, it focuses almost exclusively on specifying 
and protecting the perimeter of their negative freedom. Secondly, the identification with the 
political community is only expressed through passive obedience to law and authority. As a 
result, it is intrinsically pre-reflective and founded only on the belief in the superior 
competences of those who are vested with power (Weber 1922: 20). Most interestingly, the 
same features also characterize the technocratic justification of the legitimacy of public 
power in the EU.  
 
2.2. The “Bottom-up” Interpretation of Public Power 
In a second and opposite interpretation, the fundament of public power is instead 
located in the autonomy of the free individuals. By creating a political community and by 
constituting its powers, the individuals – now united to form a societas civilis – transfer their 
original autonomy, in part or completely, to the public authority so established, vesting it 
thereby with sovereignty. 
The “bottom-up” conception of public power is the result of the transition from a 
holistic social order to the individualistic paradigm, which was initiated by Thomas Hobbes 
in the mid-seventeenth century (Dellavalle 2011). Hobbes reversed for the first time in 
history the traditional hierarchy between the individual and the community, placing 
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individuals – as holders of rights and as the fundamental source of all legitimate authority – 
at the centre of political life. The starting point of his political philosophy, therefore, was 
no longer the social community as a factum brutum based on the natural sociability of 
humans and organically organized in a hierarchical structure, but the individuals with their 
inherent endowment of rights, interests and reason (Hobbes 1642: Book I, Chap. I). In the 
original condition of the state of nature – a fictitious condition, constructed by Hobbes not 
to recall the historical beginning of social life, but to draw attention to the ontological 
foundation and the conceptual preconditions of a just order – individuals are free and equal 
(Hobbes 1642: Book I, Chap. III). On the other hand, they are constantly in danger of 
being attacked and suffering damage to their life, physical integrity or property by their 
peers, who always endeavour to seize the greatest possible amount of resources in order to 
improve their living conditions and, ultimately, their chances of survival (Hobbes 1642: 
Book I, Chap. I; Hobbes 1651: XIII). Therefore, it is the law of nature itself which 
commands the individual to leave the state of nature by forming a society in which life, 
physical integrity and property are adequately protected (Hobbes 1642: Book I, Chap. II; 
Hobbes 1651: XIV). According to Hobbes, the political community is thus not the original 
source of the ethical world, nor does it possess an axiological primacy in its context. 
Rather, it is a tool that individuals – the real axiological barycentre of the ethical world – 
give to themselves in order to improve social stability. In Hobbes’s vision, power is 
ascending to the extent that it is no longer seen as an element that the given political 
authority deduces from divine law or from its own alleged natural superiority. Rather, it 
arises from the original freedom and independence of individuals, who create the sovereign 
authority by an act of free will, i.e., by transferring their rights to the newly established 
public power in order to ensure an adequate protection of the individual entitlements on 
the basis of the legitimacy emanating from the same fundament of social order. Sovereign 
power is, therefore, only legitimate if it aims – directly or indirectly – to safeguard 
fundamental rights and is based on a free, reflexive and explicit endorsement by the people. 
Within the strand of political philosophy originated by Hobbes, this approval takes the 
form of a contract, or pactum unionis; in liberal democracies, which are the legitimate heirs of 
this tradition of political thought, it is expressed through political participation both in 
elections as well as in practices of civic involvement and commitment outside the electoral 
schedule. 
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Differences emerge between the supporters of modern contractualism if we consider 
the extent of competences attributed to public power. This depends, ultimately, on how 
many rights are transferred to a sovereign authority by the individuals as the original rights 
holders in the moment of the creation of the societas civilis. Where the transfer of rights is 
minimized – as in the liberal theory of John Locke – public power has the sole task of 
ensuring compliance with the law, so that inter-individual transactions can develop 
peacefully. Individuals thus retain all their original capabilities, except the right to take the 
law into their own hands. The danger of an excessive concentration of competences in 
public authority is also prevented by means of a division of powers and by the creation of a 
powerful parliament (Locke 1690: Book II, Chap. 7, § 90; Book II, Chap. 11, § 134; Book 
II, Chap. 12, § 143; Book II, Chap. 13, § 150). In the pessimistic perspective of Hobbes, on 
the contrary, social order can only be safeguarded if individuals give up all their 
entitlements except the right to life and – very partially – to the safeguarding of an essential 
space of negative freedom. Within that space, individuals can pursue those activities that 
help to achieve “happiness”, but only insofar as such actions do not jeopardize the overall 
order of peace (Hobbes 1642: Book II, Chap. XIII; Hobbes 1651: XVII). It follows that 
Hobbes’s contractualism is characterized by the passage from the condition of free 
individuals to that of subjects deprived of almost all rights: by agreeing to the pactum unionis, 
the freedom of individuals in the status naturae goes through a process of voluntary quasi-
annihilation, which vests the sovereign authority with virtually unlimited powers. In 
addition to both liberal contractualism and to that strand of contract theory that eventually 
comes to absolutist results, a third alternative is represented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
radical-democratic idea of the “social contract”. Here too, sovereign power is established 
by a transfer of original rights, which is, in some ways, even more uncompromising than in 
the variant advocated by Hobbes. Indeed, Rousseau’s social contract provides for the 
alienation of all natural rights, without exception (Rousseau 1762: 51). The difference 
compared to Hobbes is that, while in the view of the English philosopher individuals 
alienate their rights to a Leviathan, in Rousseau’s proposal they transfer them back to their 
original owners, namely to themselves, now transformed by the social contract into a 
sovereign political community, which is expressed by the volonté générale. Furthermore, 
although the radical-democratic vision of Rousseau shows an attitude which is – at least 
potentially – far more sympathetic to the rights of citizens than Hobbes’s contractualist 
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absolutism, it nevertheless encompasses a significant dark side. In fact, as a consequence of 
both the complete transfer of individual rights and an insufficient establishment of 
institutions with the task of counterbalancing such transfer, the sovereign authority of the 
volonté générale ends up neglecting the effective protection of the concrete individuality of 
citizens. It is no coincidence that Rousseau defines the members of the community 
founded on the “social contract” not only as “citoyens” but also as “sujets”, in particular in 
their relation to public power, deeming it acceptable that they are even “forced to be free” 
(Rousseau 1762: 54).  
In conclusion, despite the limitations that emerge from all three “bottom-up” 
conceptions of public power that have been examined – from the self-denial of the citizens 
in Hobbes, to public power as a mere protection of private law property in Locke, and, 
finally, to the risks of authoritarianism in Rousseau – modern contractualism has been and 
still is the historical and conceptual reference point for all those who believe that power is 
justified only to the extent that it is at the service of interests and rational decisions of the 
citizens. More concretely, the proposals can be considered obsolete – as in the case of 
Hobbes – or warranting substantial corrections and even mutual integration – as for Locke 
and Rousseau. Nevertheless, the idea that the consent of the governed is the only source of 
the legitimacy of the rulers is still – and should be – the lodestar for anyone who does not 
want to become acquiescent by admitting that democracy is something belonging to the 
past. 
 
3. The Legitimacy of  EU Public Power 
 
Having defined the main features of the two opposing conceptions of the origin of 
public power, it is now possible to apply this conceptual framework to the EU. This 
analysis is justified primarily by the considerable influence that EU public power has on 
national societies because of their deep integration into the EU institutional framework. 
Furthermore, the EU has developed its own specific public power, which may have been 
originally created by the transfer of competences from the member states, but has been – 
from the very beginning – largely independent of the exercise of sovereignty by member 
states (Dellavalle 2004/2005). Nor did the developments that followed the explosion of the 
sovereign debt crisis in late 2009 re-establish the centrality of the traditional decision-
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making-processes of nation states: although extensively redesigning the settings of EU 
power, they merely transferred this from the supranational to the intergovernmental and 
technocratic-executive dimension. 
The debate about the legitimacy of EU public power stands out, among other reasons, 
as the ideological and cultural terrain in which the old argument of the justification of the 
power “from above”, i.e., on the basis of allegedly superior skills of those who exercise that 
power, has found new impetus. Indeed, the “top-down” vision of public power – which 
had been marginalised, first, by philosophical criticism, then by the liberal and democratic 
revolutions, and, finally, by popular sovereignty – has been granted in the European 
context an unexpected revival. The fact that the debate on EU public power has been the 
context on which the elitist vision regained momentum does not mean, however, that this 
is the only way to interpret its reality and possible developments. To the contrary, EU 
public power can also be legitimated “from below”, to maintain the highest democratic 
standards within the EU institutions as well.  
 
3.1. Democratic Legitimation 
The view that EU public power needs autonomous democratic legitimation is 
essentially based on a simple syllogism, the premises of which are, respectively, a) that 
every public authority is legitimate only if it derives from the free and reflexive will of those 
who are subject to that power, and b) that the EU is characterized by its own public power. 
The conclusion, therefore, cannot but be that c) EU public power will be legitimate only if 
it ascends from its citizens. However, it is not enough to say that the legitimation of EU 
public power by the European citizens is necessary; it is also indispensable to demonstrate 
that it is possible. One could assert – along with the supporters of the so-called “no demos 
thesis” – that, although there is undoubtedly an EU public power, this cannot be subject to 
the traditional “bottom-up” democratic legitimation because of the lack of a European 
“demos” (Grimm 1995). The concept of “demos” refers to a social and political 
community which is assumed to be united by pre-political and pre-legal bonds. Due to the 
presence of a sufficient social and cultural uniformity, as well as of a strong communicative 
sphere, the “demos” can take the role of a political actor and guarantee ascending 
legitimacy. As a result, without a “demos”, or without a people characterized by a sufficient 
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degree of homogeneity, according to this powerful narration no popular legitimation can 
be achieved. 
If we admit the inescapability of the “no demos thesis”, then two scenarios are 
possible: either supranational public power is to be drastically downsized by reallocating a 
large part of its competences to the nation states which are supposed to be appropriately 
legitimated through internal democratic procedures, or we should opt for a post-
democratic legitimacy. But is the “no demos thesis” really inescapable? Not necessarily – at 
least if we follow the arguments of Jürgen Habermas, one of the most committed and 
influential advocates of the democratization of EU institutions (Habermas 1996: 185; 
Habermas 1998: 151; Habermas 2008: 106; Habermas 2011: 43; Habermas 2015: 552). 
According to his interpretation, which is based on a long tradition of studies on 
nationalism and on the history of nation states, the “people” in the Western tradition of the 
last two centuries is far from being an entity based solely or even primarily on pre-reflexive 
elements. Rather, it is the product of a complex operation by which national elites, 
especially during the nineteenth century, have forged a shared identity through the use of 
instruments and institutions both public and private, like the military, the school, the 
judiciary, the public administration, the press, and culture at large (Breuilly 1982; Gellner 
1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 1991). Taking up the idea of the essentially political origin 
of the “people” does not imply, however, that the existence of some features which may 
distinguish a social community even before the start of the political process has to be 
utterly denied, or even less that the presence of a feeling of shared belonging once this 
process has been brought to completion should be ignored. What is stressed, here, is rather 
that the sense of collective identity is not the result of some “ethnic origin of nations” 
(Smith 1986), but a highly mediated cultural construct which is based on political decisions 
(Dellavalle 2002). 
If the absence of a historically cemented “European people” should not be seen as an 
insurmountable obstacle to the consolidation of a democratic legitimacy at the 
supranational level, then the question arises as to the institutional arrangements that could 
give voice in the best way to the community of European citizens who are assumed to be 
united by a common aspiration to meet common challenges with shared solutions. 
Furthermore, the institutional arrangements should also help to consolidate the still fragile 
European identity by forging a common democratic ethos. On the other hand, EU 
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constitutionalism has also been interpreted as a rationalization of European national 
democracies insofar as it opens them up to a stronger awareness of the impact that national 
decisions may have on the interests of neighbouring countries (Maduro 2010). This surely 
makes sense, but only if the rationalizing institutional construct is itself democratic. 
Otherwise, it risks missing precisely those supranational legitimacy resources which are 
necessary to tame the arrogance of national selfishness. Going now more into detail as 
regards the institutional reforms which would allow the EU institutional system to align 
itself with the tradition of democratic “bottom-up” legitimacy, and resorting once again to 
Habermas’s suggestions, a central role has to be assigned to the European Parliament (EP). 
In particular, this should be elected according to a single procedure and have legislative 
initiative. In addition, the “ordinary legislative procedure”, in which the EP is on equal 
footing with the Council, should be extended to all areas of competence. As regards the 
European Council, this would merge with the Council, forming a “House of Nationalities”, 
comparable to the US Senate, but vested with more competences. As for the European 
Commission (EC), this would assume the task of a government accountable to both the 
EP and the Council (Habermas 2015: 554). Finally, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) 
would expand its field of intervention, taking on a similar role as the US Supreme Court. 
As a consequence of the crisis, Habermas has recently introduced two significant 
integrations into his proposal. The first consists in a stronger emphasis on solidarity among 
the peoples involved in the project of European integration. To better delineate his idea, 
Habermas resorts to the distinction between moral and ethical uses of practical reason 
(Habermas 1991: 100). In short, the moral use of practical reason is implemented when we 
have to define what we owe to every other human being due to the mere fact that we share 
the same human condition, so that the duties, here, are strictly universalistic and 
independent of any guarantee of reciprocity. On the other hand, the ethical use of reason is 
realized within particular contexts, thus establishing our mutual obligation to solidarity. 
Therefore, moral duties involve everyone, but are substantially “thinner”, i.e., they are 
limited to guaranteeing fundamental rights, while including redistributive measures only 
insofar as essential requirements are safeguarded. In contrast, obligations to solidarity 
benefit only those who make up the particular social unit and are expected to extend 
expensive redistributive performances on the basis of reciprocity and of a shared political 
identity (Habermas 2013: 102). Traditionally, solidarity is nourished by a belonging to pre-
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political social communities, the most significant example of which is the family. In the 
nation state, pre-political solidarity has expanded to be a mutual responsibility of civic 
character, though still shrouded within the almost naturalistic guise of the national 
community. If it is true, however, that the nation is largely a political construct, then 
nothing in principle prevents civic solidarity from developing in the context of European 
integration as well. To this end, full recognition must be given to European citizenship, so 
that European citizens achieve full awareness of the centrality of the European project for 
the constitution of their political identity (Habermas 2011: 75; Habermas 2015: 553). 
The second innovation introduced by Habermas in recent years is conceptually more 
complex and displays a considerable impact in its overall political and philosophical 
conception. The starting points are, on the one hand, the revival of nationalistic feelings in 
many European countries, and, on the other, a legal paradox. As for the social and political 
dimension, it is striking that the muscular neo-nationalism of the member states comes 
along with a general increase in the trust that European peoples are keen to lay in their 
executives – but much less in their parliaments – as the best guarantors of the values of 
freedom and justice that are enshrined in national constitutions. The legal paradox lies in 
the fact that on the basis of the jurisprudence of the CJEU (Weiler 1999: 19), and now also 
of a statement added by the contracting parties to the Lisbon Treaty, EU law has been 
granted “primacy” over the law of member states in matters of EU competence – even, 
though with some limitations, over their constitutional law – but not an overall hierarchical 
supremacy. Therefore, while in the federal tradition a general priority of the law of the 
federation over that of the federated subunits is recognized, in the EU we are faced with a 
complex and stratified system in which the primacy of EU law in matters of supranational 
competence is matched by the ongoing centrality of national legal sources and practices as 
regards the safeguard of essential standards of freedom and justice. This paradox – at least 
from the point of view of the traditional unitary and hierarchical legal system – has been 
generally accepted by way of compromise, but was never resolved through a solid 
conceptual basis.  
Habermas addresses the question through an original conceptual construction 
(Habermas 2011, 59; Habermas 2013: 80; Habermas 2015: 553), which bears some 
resemblance to the theory of demoi-cracy, although maintaining a stronger federalist 
component (Nicolaidis 2003; Cheneval/Schimmelfennig 2013; Bellamy 2013). In particular, 
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he claims that in a traditional federal system the legitimation of central public authorities is 
guaranteed by the citizens of the federation exclusively in this function. In other words, insofar 
as they are called to give legitimacy to the central public power, the citizens of the 
federation suspend their status as citizens of the member states and come into action only 
in their political identity related to the central unit. In doing so, they are indeed the source 
of two forms of legitimacy – that of the federation and that of the federated state of which 
they are also citizens – but the two procedures of legitimation are strictly independent. In 
contrast, EU citizens do not suspend their status as citizens of the member states in 
legitimizing EU public power, so that legitimacy is here inherently twofold, coming at the 
same time from EU citizens and from the citizens of the member states. This dual 
legitimacy is expressed in the EU institutional structure through the ordinary legislative 
procedure, according to which a bill must be approved by both the EP and the Council, 
and therefore, even if indirectly, by the citizens of the member states. The specific EU 
system of shared sovereignty achieves two results: on the one hand, it ensures democratic 
legitimacy to EU institutions; on the other, since in the EU institutional context the 
member states are not constitutional organs – such as in the traditional federations – but 
remain constituent powers, national states would retain their original role of guarantors of 
the standards of freedom and justice which have been consolidated by domestic 
constitutions. The conceptual construction of dual legitimacy would also have the merit of 
solving the paradox of the sector-specific primacy of the EU without developing a general 
hierarchical supremacy. In fact, if nation states continue to be fully and independently 
legitimized in a democratic sense, then the law produced by them – in particular at the 
constitutional level – has full autonomy and equal legal status with respect to the more 
inclusive EU law. As a result, in a multilayered and stratified legal system conflicts between 
norms cannot be resolved by resorting to a hierarchy of sources that is missing and should 
not be established, but only through dialogue between institutions and, in particular, 
between courts. 
The denunciation of the “democratic deficit” of the EU, as well as proposals to 
overcome it, have been part of the debate – with only marginal adjustments – for at least 
thirty years. In this sense, the assertion that “none other than Germany’s leading 
philosopher and public intellectual keeps designing the contours of a non-federal European 
democracy which would build upon the co-originality of European and national identities” 
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(Chalmers/Jachtenfuchs/Joerges 2016b: 17) should be understood, if not as a joke, then as 
a kind of low blow in a hard-fought ideological and political battle. In fact, although often 
sidelined by the predominant technocratic mainstream, proposals for a “bottom-up” 
democratization of the EU are present in a debate which goes even more into detail than 
Habermas’s suggestions (Franzius/Preuss 2012; The Spinelli Group 2013). Nor do they 
deserve to be ridiculed. Nevertheless, a substantial problem persists which should not be 
simply passed over in silence. Indeed, if the analysis is correct and solutions for a “bottom-
up” democratization are feasible, why have these never been successfully implemented? 
Yet, the answer could be easier than many seem to assume – and not so negative for the 
outlook of EU democracy. Concretely, it might not be a question of substantial and objective 
impossibility, but of a lacking of will, whereby the latter is by far more prone to changing than 
the former. The reason for democratic stagnation should be sought, thus, in the fact that, 
for an institutional reorganization to be realized, a political will is needed which has been 
missing in the last decades of European integration. In reality, the centrifugal forces of 
parochial interests were not only always present, and powerful in slowing down the process 
of integration, but eventually gained the upper hand by sidelining efforts towards 
democratization, and by imposing an old-fashioned and ultimately inefficient 
intergovernmental method. The current crisis of the democratization impetus does not 
prove, however, that the idea was wrong. Rather, the poor results that have been achieved 
by applying the opposite approach should be a strong motivation to take up the 
supranational democratic perspective again. In fact, contrary to what Hegel thought, what 
is real is not always the perfect implementation of the rational. 
 
3.2. Technocratic Legitimacy 
The starting point of the second way to legitimate EU public power is the exact 
opposite to the approach analyzed in the previous section, namely that full democratic 
legitimacy would not be possible at the supranational level due to the absence of a 
European demos. Therefore, no alternative is given to the post-democratic legitimacy of 
EU public power, which – curiously enough – turns out to be quite similar to some pre-
democratic forms of legitimacy. The core assumptions of this approach were perfectly 
synthesized by Fritz Wilhelm Scharpf in a seminal work which was published – almost as a 
kind of counter-proposal – during the most creative period of EU constitutionalism 
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(Scharpf 1999). Scharpf placed at the basis of his analysis the distinction between two 
forms of legitimacy: “input-oriented legitimacy”, and “output-oriented legitimacy”. The 
first refers to the participation of the citizens in the creation of the norms that govern their 
lives, corresponding therefore to what Abraham Lincoln defined as “government by the 
people”. In contrast, the second form of legitimacy addresses a largely passive acceptance 
of authority, due mainly to the belief that this acts in the common interest, thus 
accomplishing what has been called – again by Lincoln – “government for the people”. 
While the first understanding insists on the active involvement of the governed, the second 
focuses on their tacit consent, at least as long as the measures taken by the authorities are 
perceived as beneficial to the self-realization of individuals in the sphere of their negative 
freedom as well as to the improvement of their living conditions. In nation states, the two 
dimensions of legitimacy generally coexist, so that civic participation almost naturally leads 
to the implementation of shared interests, and the involvement by the citizens comes 
along, almost seamlessly, with a high degree of trust in institutional arrangements. 
However, this unity of purpose is – according to Scharpf – far from obvious; on the 
contrary, it is rooted in a pre-existing substrate of common historical, linguistic, cultural 
and ethnic elements. In other words, without a pre-political and pre-legal dimension, no 
guarantee is given that a legitimacy of public power that ascends from the will of the 
governed will lead to the benefit of all, and not just of a majority. Since Europe lacks a 
common pre-political and pre-legal substrate, the result cannot but be that the two 
dimensions of legitimacy no longer spontaneously overlap.  
The conclusion drawn by Scharpf was that EU public power should be understood 
quite restrictively, and still depends essentially on the agreement of national governments. 
Moreover, since in a context devoid of a strong collective identity it cannot be guaranteed 
that decisions taken by a majority are perceived by all as aiming at the implementation of 
common interests, EU legitimacy cannot but be essentially “output-oriented”. Faced with 
the silent consent of the citizens, the legitimacy of EU public power is to be built – in 
consonance with Weber’s concept of “rational” legitimacy – on the assumption of a higher 
expertise implicitly attributed to the holders of public power. Therefore, if EU public 
power does not to find its raison d’être in the active consent of EU citizens, and in their 
democratic participation, but in the widespread confidence in the competence of the EU 
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institutions, then we will be faced with a kind of revival, although under a new and specific 
guise, of what has been defined before as the “descendant” understanding of public power. 
Scharpf’s theory of output-oriented legitimacy as the only way to justify EU public 
power was flanked, and followed, by numerous similar attempts. Even Joseph H. H. Weiler 
– for decades probably the most refined expert of EU law at the international level – did 
not refrain from the effort to give reasons for the unjustifiable EU democratic deficit. 
Indeed, he introduced in his analysis of the specific features of supranational power the 
distinction between a “formal” and a “social” legitimacy, where the latter “connotes a 
broad, empirically determined, social acceptance of the system” (Weiler 1999: 80). Insofar 
as he admitted that one of the main problems of EU power lies precisely in its lack of 
legitimation, the solutions proposed, aiming primarily at ensuring greater transparency, 
were far from satisfying the fundamental epistemic principle of democracy, namely that 
volenti non fit iniuria, and from guaranteeing full democratic participation (Weiler 1999: 348). 
In fact, Weiler openly admitted that the quality of European integration should not be 
sought in the extension of democratic practices to the post-national constellation, but 
rather in the respect of the “other” and in “constitutional tolerance” (Weiler 2001: 62). 
A further variant of the technocratic justification of EU public power underlines – in a 
way which may be surprising, at least at first glance – its deliberative dimension, in 
particular with reference to the phenomenon which has been described as “comitology”. 
This concept refers to the practice, specified by law, whereby the powers of the EC are 
exercised, in the application of EU law, by having recourse to committees composed of 
representatives of the member states. The procedure can be interpreted – with good 
reasons – as having the primary purpose of maintaining control by member states in areas 
deemed sensitive to national interests, thus limiting the autonomy of the EC as a 
supranational body. Nor is it to be assumed that the reform of comitology introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty, albeit slightly strengthening the EP, really did change the 
intergovernmental setting (Savino 2011). Comitology, however, was also read in almost the 
opposite perspective, i.e., not as an instrument of governance implemented by the 
executives in order to circumvent parliamentary control, be it national or supranational, but 
as an expression of deliberative participation in Europe. Concretely, the comitology system 
would have the merit of creating a space where domestic interests, represented by national 
governments, can be mutually recognized, and thence finally reach a respectful agreement 
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between different positions (Joerges/Neyer 1997). In fact, it may be understandable that, 
once the dominance of the executive powers is accepted, the creation of spaces for 
dialogue between governments should be welcomed. A significant problem arises, 
however, when the advocates of comitology improperly apply to the phenomenon a 
conceptual framework which is explicitly derived from the theory of democracy. By 
interpreting intergovernmental confrontation as a deliberative sphere, they normatively 
ennoble the transfer of competences from the legislative to the executive. In other words, 
deliberation among citizens that characterizes democratic practice is replaced by 
deliberation among member states. As a result, the theory of comitology becomes an 
ideological tool to mask the technocratic expropriation of citizenry. 
The same cloaking of technocratic rule by its merger with an alleged deliberative 
dimension characterizes the recent introduction of the new concept of “throughput 
legitimacy” (Schmidt 2010). If input legitimacy focuses on democratic procedures to 
guarantee the participation of citizens, and output legitimacy focuses on the performances 
that a political and legal system has to provide in order to be accepted, throughput 
legitimacy addresses what might be called “the interest consultation with the people” 
(Schmidt 2010: 7). In other words, attention is devoted here to what happens within EU 
governance processes and, in particular, to how these should be open to requests from the 
civil society. According to Vivien Schmidt’s analysis, “throughput legitimacy via interest-
based intermediation and consultation with the people … represents a way in which 
minority interests can gain a voice even without a majority vote” (Schmidt 2010: 20). These 
interests include not only the demands made by large and powerful economic actors but 
also “more diffuse difficult-to-organize majority interests such as consumer groups and 
public interest oriented groups such as environmental groups, policy think-tanks or even 
social movements” (Schmidt 2010: 20). In conclusion, a decision is legitimate insofar as it 
takes into account as many and various proposals emerging from the population as 
possible. Regardless of whatever good intention might have inspired it, the introduction of 
the new notion of throughput legitimacy is problematic for two main reasons. First, 
attention to processes that, in addition to participation in elections, allow an ongoing 
involvement of citizens and organizations of the civil society is in itself an inescapable 
feature of any serious theory of democracy. Thus, the introduction of a new concept turns 
out to be superfluous and in clear contradiction with the essential epistemological principle 
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contained in Ockham's razor. Nevertheless, it would be naive to believe that the problems 
of the theory of throughput legitimacy can be reduced only to a methodological dimension. 
In fact – and this is the second reason for criticism – democratic discourse and genuine 
participation are substituted, here, by a highly selective opening of institutions to the civil 
society, in which no guarantee of equal treatment is given. In doing so, however, one of the 
main features of a true democracy is cancelled, namely the neutralization of the social 
dimensions of power by political interactions within the democratic arena. 
While the theories of comitology and throughput legitimacy ennoble the technocratic 
drift by masking it behind a curtain of democratic conceptualism, another form of the 
revival of the “descendant” justification of public power explicitly endorses the supremacy 
of the bureaucratic-administrative regime. By doing so, it turns back to the clear-cut 
alternative, proposed by Scharpf, between a democratic and a functional legitimacy. A first 
variant of this uncompromising apology of technocratic legitimacy is based on the 
application of the concept of “executive federalism” to the EU (Dann 2006: 237). This 
notion, which is derived from the Exekutivföderalismus of the German constitutional 
tradition, refers to a particular form of federalism where federated subunits take on the 
implementation of the decisions issued by federal institutions. As a result, federal 
administration is reduced to a minimum, and federated subunits, in return for their efforts 
to give direct effect to federal legislation, are granted a central role in the determination of 
common policies. The analogous supranational organ to the German Bundesrat would be 
the Council, although, because of deeper cultural and political differences, the competences 
of the latter are broader, the defense of parochial interests fiercer, and the resulting 
difficulty in reaching compromises greater. The application of the concept to the EU, 
however, may be misleading. In fact, while national “executive federalism” is moderated by 
robust parliamentary control mechanisms, in the EU no similar institutional arrangements 
exist, so that “political responsibility … becomes diffused, until it vanishes in its entirety” 
(Oeter 2006: 79). 
If the theory of “executive federalism” still shows some restraints in its defence of the 
technocratic legitimacy of EU public power, according to a second variant no room is left 
for doubt: the legitimacy of EU public power, here, is openly and unequivocally defined as 
a purely “administrative legitimacy”. After reiterating the “no demos thesis”, Peter 
Lindseth applies the conceptual construction of the relation between “principal” and 
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“agent” to the EU, arguing, as a result, that EU institutions cannot but have a “functional” 
legitimacy since they are administrative “agents” of decisions taken by the nation states as 
“principals”. In that sense, they are operating in a space located beyond the sphere in 
which democratic legitimacy takes place (Lindseth 2014: 534). Lindseth does not deny the 
autonomy of the decision-making-processes of EU institutions, but rather intends to 
identify and justify a decisional context which should be regarded as free from any 
obligation to legitimation by the citizens, in particular in their quality as EU citizens. If the 
source of identifiable and significant legitimacy is the nation state, but this is so far away 
that the legitimation chain becomes almost imperceptible, then the technocratic Golem has 
finally received its breath of life and its justification to move into the realm of a post-
democratic autonomy. 
 
4. Which Scenarios for the Future? 
 
At this point we must ask ourselves which scenarios for the future are reasonable and 
desirable on the basis of the conceptual framework presented in the previous sections. In 
this regard, we can see how the recent crisis has been dealt with according to procedures 
that have clearly favoured the “descendant” conception of public power. In fact, one of the 
most important measures – namely the Fiscal Compact of 2012, which came into force in 
2013, compelling nation states as signing parties to insert into “provisions of binding force 
and permanent character, preferably constitutional” the rule that national budgets “shall be 
balanced or in surplus” – is an international treaty which, although signed by 25 EU 
member states, is outside the EU legal framework stricto sensu. The most obvious 
consequence is that the EP was set aside, for the benefit of the executive powers. 
Furthermore, the idea of a full democratic legitimacy through national parliaments also 
turned out to be illusory: in fact, if it is true that international treaties require parliamentary 
ratification, it is also undeniable that the parliamentary vote in this case did not allow 
amendments and was reduced to a “yes or no”, in which the pressures by the executive 
may prove to be decisive, nor was it possible for national parliaments to control the 
subsequent measures issued by executive institutions. 
 In contrast, both the Six-Pack of 2011 and the Two-Pack of 2013 – consisting, 
respectively, of five regulations and one directive, and of two regulations – are located 
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inside the legal framework of the EU. The seven regulations and one directive were all 
adopted jointly by the EP and the Council and aimed at strengthening control over budget 
deficit. However, since this control is exercised, once again, exclusively by the executive, 
the approval by the EP equated to a substantial self-disempowerment by the EU 
legislature, which is not balanced by any comparable possibility of intervention by national 
parliaments. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which replaced in 2012 the 
previous European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM), is similarly characterized by its technocratic quality: 
although generated through an amendment to art. 136 TFEU, which was also approved by 
the EP, it centers all powers in the hands of the executive as well, either to the EC, or to 
intergovernmental committees. 
Therefore, no occasion would have been better to prove that “descending” public 
power is characterized by higher rationality and competence than the governance of the 
European financial crisis, which was fully in the hands of the executive and virtually 
autonomous from democratic control. On the contrary, instead of a perfect scenario, we 
are faced with an unstable and largely unsatisfactory situation for at least three main 
reasons. Firstly, the crisis of the Greek sovereign debt, despite having been stabilized, 
appears far from settled, as even acknowledged by the International Monetary Fund as one 
of its protagonists. Secondly, one of the justifications for European integration has always 
been the defence of the European welfare model. Contrary to what one might expect, 
however, the index that measures inequality – or Gini coefficient – has increased 
substantially in the last two decades, although in different degrees, in all EU countries, 
which provides sufficient evidence that the European technocracy was either unable or 
unwilling to defend the social benefits of continental welfare. Moreover, while the rise in 
inequality can be seen as a long-term phenomenon affecting more or less all Western 
countries and, therefore, not directly attributable to the “top-down” management of the 
debt crisis, another negative social trend, instead, has been worsening dramatically since 
2009. Indeed, the share of the population in poverty has also increased significantly, but 
not uniformly in all countries, demonstrating that the promise to bring about convergence 
in the living conditions of the populations of the member countries has also not been 
fulfilled. Thirdly, output legitimacy of public power should be based on the trust in the 
superior skills of those who are called to exercise it, both at the national and EU level. Yet, 
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if Eurostat findings are used as a basis for judgement, such confidence – albeit relatively 
stable – rarely exceeds 50 %, with an average of around 40 %, as regards the EU, while 
domestic institutions get even worse average results. 
In essence, then, the claim that technocratic governance of public affairs would achieve 
the best results due to the alleged higher rationality of power holders seems not to be 
substantiated by any evidence. Rather, it must be assumed that some of the problems that 
have emerged in recent years would have been better addressed using the fundamentals of 
a well-developed legitimacy “from below”, and of a stronger feeling of solidarity between 
citizens. Starting from the acknowledgement of this matter of fact, two opposite strategies 
– in line with the dichotomy that has informed the whole debate – are conceivable: the 
more or less far-reaching renationalization of European policies, or a decisive step 
forwards towards a convincing democratization of the EU institutions. Beginning with the 
renationalization strategy, what is striking, first, is the heterogeneity of the coalition that is 
vigorously pleading for it. At least three different groups – and interests – are gathered 
under a variegated banner. The first group – the location of which is less surprising – 
comprises those who, like Dieter Grimm, always warned against the risks of European 
integration going too far. In particular, the need is underlined to preserve the national 
political community as the only area in which democratic legitimacy can be fully 
implemented. In his more recent works, however, Grimm takes for granted what he had 
previously criticized, namely the “constitutionalization” of the EU. Yet, even if the EU is 
assumed to be a constitutional space sui generis, it is its presumed 
“overconstitutionalization” that Grimm now rejects (Grimm 2015). His proposal for a 
simplification of EU primary law, which should cover only the most properly 
constitutional contents, while many specific provisions now contained in the treaties 
should move into secondary law, surely deserves to be taken seriously. Nevertheless, what 
disturbs Grimm most seems to be that the “overconstitutionalization” of the EU would 
have led to an excessive amount of competences held by the EC and by the CJEU, with a 
further worsening of the democratic deficit. The need to counterbalance this shortcoming 
could not be entrusted, according to his perspective, to the EP because of the limits usually 
attributed to supranational democracy, namely the lack of an electoral system shared by all 
member states for the election of the EP, the disparity of representation in relation to 
population, the weakness of European parties, and the absence of a genuinely 
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supranational public opinion. Given that the diversity of representation in relation to the 
population is a feature not only of the EP, but of all federal systems due to the necessity to 
protect minorities, Grimm’s analysis – as it is always the case for explicitly or implicitly 
eurosceptical authors – does not develop any feasible solution for the strengthening of 
supranational democracy. Rather, he moves on directly to solutions which are thought to 
deconstruct the supranational dimension. More concretely, he locates the bulwark against 
technocracy and depoliticization in the European sphere in national constitutional courts 
(Grimm 2014). Yet, it is at least optimistic, if not contradictory, that the judiciary, which is 
presented as an example of technocratic drift in the EU, might be called upon to play the 
precisely opposite role in the national context. 
The presence of the second group of authors, in the midst of the renationalization 
movement, is altogether more surprising. This group consists of mainly progressive and 
leftist thinkers who have seen their hopes for a democratic and social Europe largely 
disappointed by what the Union has become. Surely, there are good reasons to be 
dissatisfied with the acquiescence of the EU towards the principles of ordoliberalism in 
general (Streeck 2014), and of capital owners in particular (Menéndez 2016a), or with its 
incapability to address the migrant crisis with a due sense of justice (Menéndez 2016b). 
Nonetheless, the quite convincing criticism against some EU policies turns out to be 
illusionary or even misleading when it ends up praising the unbroken virtues of nation 
states. As Wolfgang Streeck argues, the more we want to save what remains of the welfare 
state, the more competences the EU should give back to the member states (Streeck 2014; 
Streeck 2015). Therefore, the only kind of “more Europe” that we need would be the 
return to the continental constitutional tradition of the nation states, in which capitalism 
was tamed by the social dialectics of national politics (Somek 2013). Yet, it is curious that 
nation states, within this narrative, are not blamed for any social or political distortion, 
although the recently reintroduced intergovernmental method may have contributed to the 
shortcomings at least as strongly as – and probably more than – the supranational 
institutions. Moreover, it sounds like a profession of faith if the social and political 
conditions of nation states are regarded as essentially sound and intact, even though the 
current pathologies have originated largely in their context.  
The most astonishing presence among the supporters of renationalization, however, 
concerns the third group, which includes scholars who have been for a long time among 
 Except where otherwise noted content on this site is licensed under a Creative Commons 2.5 Italy License                   E -   
 
42 
the most committed apologists of EU governance. Though divided among themselves 
because of distinct conceptual premises – some come from the deliberative theory of 
demoi-cracy (Nicolaidis/Watson 2016), others from a rather functional understanding of 
social rationality (Scharpf 2016; Majone 2016) – they all share a plea for the partial 
disentanglement of the EU. This should happen, however, not primarily on the basis of 
considerations regarding democracy and justice – as in the former group – but for the 
purpose of maintaining some decisive functional performances, now to be re-located into 
an intergovernmental setting. According to these authors, the problem arose when 
European integration, and in particular monetary union, led to redistributive actions which 
were not covered by adequate legitimacy (Chalmers/Jachtenfuchs/Joerges 2016b: 3). To 
solve the problem, more intergovernmental cooperation should be envisaged through 
variable geometries of different associations of member states, or “club goods” 
(Chalmers/Jachtenfuchs/Joerges 2016b: 23; Majone 2016), whereas social and economic 
difficulties should be internalized and European governance should concentrate on the 
prevention of spillover-effects (Nicolaidis/Watson 2016: 75). In other words, poverty 
should be kept at home and dealt with by resorting to national means, while the 
intergovernmental level should protect the most influent shareholders – not exactly an 
attractive perspective for the future of European integration. Furthermore, it is interesting 
that the “Eurocrats” have become, here, the preferred target for criticism, whereas 
European technocracy had been generally defended for long time by the same authors. The 
reason might be that the “Eurocrats” seem to be now the most committed defenders of an 
essential level of continental solidarity against the selfish interests of the most powerful 
member states. Thus, since a further empowerment of the EP was never seen as a serious 
option by these scholars, the question is only about which institutional structure can best 
guarantee that the most powerful interests can have the most favourable stance. Until a 
couple of years ago, this appeared to be best ensured by the EU technocracy, as opposed 
to intergovernmental cooperation as advocated now. Under these premises, the belated 
revaluation of input legitimacy by Scharpf – yet only at the national level – takes the shape 
of a rather captious argument (Scharpf 2015; Scharpf 2016). 
The recent White Paper of the Future of Europe of the EC presents alternatives on the basis 
of two variables: the depth of European integration, and its inclusiveness (European 
Commission 2017). Following the first variable, we can aspire to more integration or accept a 
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weakening of EU governance, while according to the second we can aim at doing all together what 
can be generally agreed on, or take the way of a two-speed Europe, with an essentially federal core 
Union plus some more or less closely associated countries. Leaving aside the perspective of 
a weaker EU governance in the future, which would be nothing other than the 
acknowledgement of a failure with unpredictable results, all other solutions envisage some 
kind of progress in the integration process, albeit under the condition of a limited inclusion 
according to one variant. However, regardless of which option for improvement we may 
prefer, the White Paper does not mention democratic legitimacy and social solidarity as the 
crucial factors in the decisions on the future of EU integration. Against the background of 
the existential crisis of the EU project, it is time to show more courage, claiming explicitly 
that any resolution on how to go ahead should be taken on the basis of two fundamental 
criteria. The first is how the Union can be shaped in a more legitimate – in the sense of 
“bottom-up” legitimacy – and democratic way. The second criterion is how we can make it 
more socially just. As regards the first issue, if the EU “top-down” public power is in crisis, 
and the renationalization is either illusory or cynical, we cannot but resume the other 
option, namely the radical democratization of EU institutions. In this sense, it is not – or at 
least not only – about the democratization of the institutions of supranational governance, 
such as the EC, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the CJEU, as recently argued by 
Antoine Vauchez (Vauchez 2016). This step is indeed important, but it does not properly 
implement the fundamental tenets of democracy, which should be based on inclusion, 
participation and reflexive decisions by all involved. Transparency, though an essential 
condition, cannot do the job alone, replacing what is the inherent task of representative 
and participative democracy. Rather, as proposed in the Rome Manifesto of 2017, 
democratization should address the very institutional architecture of the EU by creating a 
strong legislative power made up of the EP – as the “house of the people” – and of a 
newly constituted Senate – as the “house of the states” – in which the European Council 
and the Council should merge. Furthermore, majority voting and qualified majority should 
be the rule, respectively, in the EP and in the Senate. Lastly, the President of the EU, as the 
head of the executive – or, more precisely, of a reformed Commission – should be directly 
elected through a democratic process. Yet, democratization alone cannot be enough if it 
does not come along with more solidarity and justice. EU citizens must feel again that the 
European project is about the improvement of their living conditions and that no one – no 
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individual or social group in the single states, and no single country among the member 
states of the EU – will be left behind. It is only under these conditions that the idea of a 
United Europe can hope to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the European 
citizens. 
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